Market Power and the Incentive to Innovate: A Return to Schumpeter and Arrow by Todorova, Tamara
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Market Power and the Incentive to
Innovate: A Return to Schumpeter and
Arrow
Todorova, Tamara
American University in Bulgaria
2021
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/108121/
MPRA Paper No. 108121, posted 07 Jun 2021 10:19 UTC
1 
 
Market Power and the Incentive to Innovate: 
A Return to Schumpeter and Arrow 
 
 
Using a simple linear demand and marginal cost function, we demonstrate that both competition 
and monopoly have incentives to innovate since this increases their profit levels. However, our 
results show that perfect competition is more motivated to innovate since the increase in the profit 
is greater with the same cost reduction and the same innovation. We also conclude that a more 
drastic innovation brings greater rent to the monopolist and reduces the advantages of perfect 
competition over monopoly. It could be presumed that monopoly firms would be attracted to more 
substantive innovations rather than non-drastic ones. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Industrial organization has long studied how research and development act as the engine of 
technological change, and how this change has shaped industry and the distribution of power in it. 
Many new industries have emerged out of new technologies or have prospered significantly with 
the advancement of technologies. Such industries include airspace and aircraft, computers and 
electronic communications, audio and video production, etc. Technological growth shifts the 
firm’s production function outwards and directly increases output. This way knowledge 
accumulation and knowledge diffusion give a strong impetus to the individual firm increasing its 
competitiveness. Technological growth is directly related to competition, since the production 
function of the firm is restricted by the level of technology or the technological set within which 
it operates. 
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The debate between which types of firms have stronger incentives to innovate is eternal. 
In “Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy” Joseph Schumpeter (1942) studied the managerial 
function, innovation, and the capitalist system. He saw capitalism as “creative destruction” where 
periods of quiet and stability are interrupted by the springing of new products and processes which 
create new markets, replacing the old ones. To Schumpeter market disequilibria is more common 
and typical than market equilibria, the state of flux more prevalent than the state of calmness and 
stability. Schumpeter (1942) believed that competition is not so much over prices and quantities 
but over new products and processes. He defined innovation as the knowledge that has been 
applied for the first time, in the form of a production process or product. Innovation is creative 
destruction and serves to improve the managerial function. Schumpeter viewed entrepreneurs as 
innovators and the progress of capitalism as one prompted by technological change which was 
quickly diffused and imitated. In his view perfect competition, although ideal from the welfare 
perspective, is not an efficient market structure for creating incentives for innovation. Rather, it is 
the monopoly position that creates the strongest incentives to innovate. It is the large scale of 
operations that creates advantages for innovation. 
This view was later shared by John Galbraith in “American Capitalism: The Concept of 
Countervailing Power” (Galbraith, 1956) and “The New Industrial State” (Galbraith, 1967). 
Galbraith (1956, p. 86) stated that “a benign providence … has made the modern industry of a few 
large firms an almost perfect instrument for inducing technical change. It is admirably equipped 
for financing technical development.” Galbraith (1956, p. 91) argues that the competitive model 
almost precludes technological advance and continues: 
 
“The showpieces are, with rare exceptions, the industries which are dominated by a handful 
of large firms. The foreign visitor, brought to the United States to study American 
production methods and associated marvels, visits the same firms as do attorneys of the 
Department of Justice in their search for monopoly.” 
 
While research is the discovery of new knowledge, development represents the translation of this 
new knowledge into productive processes and products. Both Schumpeter and Galbraith were 
convinced that large firms can transform existing knowledge into finished products or services and 
are the most efficient generators and transmitters of technological change since research and 
development require substantive resources, favor economies of scale and carry risks of failure 
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which can be borne by only few firms. Only big firms can run multiple research projects at a time 
so that few of them are successful. Only large firms have the resources to bring innovative ideas 
to production and exploit the advantages of new research. 
At the other extremum is Arrow (1962) who maintains that market structure dramatically 
affects the incentives of different firms to innovate and that large “sleepy” firms could be 
outstripped by more dynamic, innovative firms. The so called “sleepy monopolist” hypothesis 
assumes that the large monopoly firm has significant market power but no stimulus to innovate. 
Arrow (1962) hypothesizes that the competitive firm has greater incentives to introduce an 
innovation because this would allow it to undercut the price of every competitor in the industry, 
take the entire market demand and, eventually, turn into a pure monopoly from a pure competitor. 
In support of this Jewkes, Sawers and Stillerman (1969) argue that some major discoveries are 
being made by ordinary people with limited finances who work in “their backyard garage.” In their 
book “The Sources of Invention” they found that 33 of 61 most significant inventions of the 20th 
century were the result of individual inventive activity and only 12 inventions emanated from large 
corporate research laboratories. Product ideas such as cellophane, the jet engine and air 
conditioning were invented by private individuals. Scherer (1980), who contrasts examples in 
favor of Galbraith and Schumpeter with those against them, argues that smallness is not necessarily 
an obstacle to the creation of patentable inventions but can, in fact, be an advantage. 
 Transaction cost theory, as advanced by Coase (1937), demonstrates that technology has a 
dual effect on the firm and the market. Coase (1937) stresses that technological improvements 
such as the telephone and the telegraph contribute to the larger size of the firm since they facilitate 
the role of the managerial function. In this sense, the relationship is opposite – it is not market 
structure that determines technology but the other way round, technology shapes market structure 
with larger firms being operational due to the use of sophisticated technologies in substituting the 
market mechanism and overcoming the significant costs of market transacting. On the one hand, 
technological improvements reduce the costs of bureaucracy within hierarchical organizations, 
but, on the other hand, they help bring the factors of production in proximity on the very markets.  
Whether firms will grow or shrink depends on the relative effect of technological improvement on 
the firm and the market. If an innovation reduces market transaction costs more significantly than 
the costs of administrative organization within the firm, then the market is an efficient resource 
allocation mechanism and the size of the firm is limited. But if the innovation affects the firm 
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much more seriously, as in the case of multinational corporations which grow immensely and 
allocate global factors of production, then the effect of innovation was stronger on the particular 
firm than on the market. Growing firms supersede the market and the administrative mode has a 
stronger role in the economy. 
 Global corporations are the most vivid illustration of how technological growth and 
innovation can increase firm size. In his survey of 500 large companies in the USA in 1971 Vernon 
(1971) finds that 187 of them have a strong participation in foreign markets. It is just those 187 
corporations which invest considerably in research and development while the others do not. Thus 
Vernon (1971) concludes that multinationals are more frequent innovators and technological 
generators when it comes to their initial investment abroad. Williamson (1985) also reports that a 
high concentration of FDI in production is reported in industries where the transfer of 
technological knowledge is of special importance. But there is one more reason for the 
concentration of advanced technologies in large corporations. The need to protect their industrial 
and technological knowhow forces large companies to integrate vertically or horizontally, thus 
expanding in size. The “knowledge paradox” as introduced by Arrow (1962) demonstrates that a 
piece of knowledge is only valuable to someone once this knowledge is revealed to him. But once 
the knowledge is revealed and the buyer of the information finds how potentially important it is to 
him, he has no incentive to pay for it. This is how corporations have difficulty protecting their 
knowhow through the market mechanism and prefer to safeguard it by organizational means and 
firm growth. Buckley and Casson (1976), Hennart (1980), Kang (1990), etc. support the view that 
multinationals are key generators of innovations and try to protect them through firm expansion, 
i.e., through forward, backward, or horizontal integration. This technological determinism perhaps 
results from the fact that multinationals are quite receptive when it comes to innovation. Their 
technological intensiveness determines their growth, success, and domination in the global 
economy. The technological factor seems to have a stronger impact on the global corporation, 
rather than on the market, which determined the rise of the multinational firm in the world today. 
 The essential question remains – does market structure influence technological change and 
how? Would a monopolist or a competitive firm be more likely to introduce an invention? The 
fierce competition among firms in competitive sectors can speed innovation but only the budgets 
of large firms allow them to finance major research initiatives and to stimulate technological 
change. Others join the Schumpeter-Arrow discussion in later years. Tirole (1997), Sutton (1998, 
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2007), Gilbert (2006), Shapiro (2012) and many others discuss the role of competition and 
innovation. Gilbert (2006) and Shapiro (2012) define some principles by which competition and 
innovation are interrelated. Holmes, Levine and Schmitz (2012) maintain that monopolies may be 
less inventive due to switchover disruptions. These are interruptions of the production process 
when upon adoption of the new technology the firm must temporarily reduce its output of the pre-
adoption level. 
Our paper is a modest contribution to the Schumpeter-Arrow debate. We no way aim to 
thoroughly review the extensive literature on the matter but propose a simple framework for 
analysing the incentives of the two firms to innovate.1 Using a simple linear demand function and 
linear (constant and rising) marginal cost, we demonstrate that both types of market structure have 
incentives to innovate since innovation inevitably increases their profits levels. Furthermore, we 
find that the incentives for perfect competition to innovate are stronger since the increase in the 
profit at the same level of cost reduction, i.e., innovation, are greater for the competitive firm. The 
more drastic the innovation, the greater the rents which accrue to the monopolist which implies 
that monopoly firms would be lured to more substantive inventions rather than minor ones. Ours 
is a static model which bases the incentive for innovation on profit levels. Being simple, the model 
does not consider other aspects of industrial organizations such as product differentiation, 
elasticities or speed of research and development. The section that follows is a discussion of this 
simple setting comparing competition and monopoly. The paper ends with conclusions. 
 
2. Competition versus monopoly 
 
With a linear demand function bqap −= , where a  and b  are positive parameters, the marginal 
revenue function is twice as steep, that is, 𝑀𝑅(𝑞) = 𝑎 − 2𝑏𝑞. With constant marginal cost 
ii cMC = , ( 2,1=i ), where the slope of the marginal cost function is assumed to be zero, the graph 
follows Figure 1. In the case of the competitive outcome, we assume that the firm charges the 
lowest possible price equal to marginal cost. Since firms in competitive industries use standardized 
equipment and there is free entry, it is difficult for them to lower the price further. Innovation 
improves the process of production by reducing marginal cost. It is rather sudden, unexpected for 
 
1 For a more detailed review of the literature on competition and innovation see Shapiro (2012) and Holmes, Levine, 
and Schmitz (2012). 
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the perfect competitor. If the industry were served by a single firm, the market demand curve 
would be relatively steep and extended from the origin of the coordinate system. 
 
Figure 1. Profit maximization under constant 𝑀𝐶 
 
Before the innovation, the competitive firm sells at 𝑝𝑐′ = 𝑀𝐶1 = 𝑐1, that is, at the competitive 
outcome. Thus, for the output we have 𝑀𝐶1(𝑞) = 𝑐1 = 𝑎 − 𝑏𝑞 which gives 
b
ca
qc
1−=  at 1cpc =          (1) 
Theoretically after the introduction of the innovation the competitive firm could produce greater 
output and charge a price equal to the new marginal cost 𝑀𝐶2 = 𝑐2 , such that 
b
ca
qc
2−=  and 2cpc = ,        (2) 
but the competitive firm would like to benefit from the innovation and would keep on producing 
at the initial point realizing an economic rent. The rent which accrues to the innovating competitor 
is  
  0)()()()( 11212 =
−
=
−
−=−= ccccc qc
b
ca
c
b
ca
ccqqMCp ,    (3) 
where ∆𝑐 is the result of innovation representing the reduction in production costs. Since 
previously the firm did not achieve any economic profit, this result is also the increase in profit 
 
  
   
 
 
 
  c1 
 
  c2 
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from an initial level of zero, that is, ∆𝜋𝑐 = 𝜋𝑐. In the case of monopoly constant marginal costs 
produce the following results: 
b
ca
qm
2
1−=   𝑝𝑚′ = 𝑎+𝑐12         (4) 
The monopoly output is half of the competitive output 
b
ca
qc
1−= . After the innovation, the 
optimal monopoly quantity and price are 
b
ca
qm
2
2−=   𝑝𝑚″ = 𝑎+𝑐22         (5) 
The increase in monopoly output depends on the magnitude of the innovation and is found to be 𝑞𝑚″ = 𝑞𝑚′ + 𝛥𝑐2𝑏           (6) 
According to Church and Ware (2000) a drastic innovation is one where the monopoly price after 
the innovation falls below the level of the original marginal cost, that is, the ex-post price is lower 
than the ex-ante marginal cost. A non-drastic innovation is one which does not reduce the price so 
substantially, and the ex-post price remains higher than the ex-ante marginal cost. Due to the 
reduction in the costs the optimal monopoly output increases, while the optimal monopoly price 
falls. The monopolist benefits from the innovation if his profit of launching it increases, that is, ∆𝜋𝑚 > 0. To find this out, we need to express the monopoly profit before and after the innovation. 
The profit before the innovation is 
  0
4
)(
2
)(
2
)(
2
11
1
1
1 
−
=
−





 −
+
=−=
b
ca
b
ca
c
ca
qqMCp mmmm      (7) 
With the innovation the monopoly achieves profit to the amount 
  0
4
)(
2
)(
2
)(
2
22
2
2
2 
−
=
−





 −
+
=−=
b
ca
b
ca
c
ca
qqMCp mmmm     (8) 
This profit is clearly bigger since the costs of production decline substantially while the other 
parameters are the same. The increase in profit for the monopolist, therefore, is 𝛥𝜋𝑚 = 𝜋𝑚″ − 𝜋𝑚′ = (𝑎 − 𝑐2)2 − (𝑎 − 𝑐1)24𝑏 = (2𝑎 − 𝑐2 − 𝑐1)(𝑐1 − 𝑐2)4𝑏 = 
=𝛥𝑐 (2𝑎−𝑐1−𝑐2)4𝑏 = ∆𝑐2 (𝑞𝑚′ + 𝑞𝑚′′ ) > 0        (9) 
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Comparing 𝛥𝜋𝑐 and 𝛥𝜋𝑚, we can check that 2𝑞𝑐′ > 𝑞𝑚′ + 𝑞𝑚′′  where 𝑞𝑚′′  is lower that 𝑞𝑐′ , as can be 
seen from the graph, and 𝑞𝑚′  is half of 𝑞𝑐′ , as found previously.2 Hence, 𝛥𝜋𝑐 > 𝛥𝜋𝑚           (10) 
Therefore, the competitive firm clearly has greater incentives to innovate than the monopoly firm, 
ceteris paribus. Substituting for 𝑞𝑚′′  in monopoly profit, 𝛥𝜋𝑚 = ∆𝑐2 (2𝑞𝑚′ + ∆𝑐2𝑏)          (11) 
We can apply an identical analysis to the case of linear and rising marginal cost MC . This case 
produces two essential subcases. In one subcase the post-innovation output of the monopolist 𝑞𝑚″  
is lower than the competitive output 𝑞𝑐′ . Figure 2 illustrates this case. Figure 3 illustrates the case 
when 𝑞𝑚″   exceeds 𝑞𝑐′ . We explore both cases further. 
 
Subcase 1. 𝑞𝑐′ > 𝑞𝑚″  
In this case the post-innovation price of the monopolist 𝑝𝑚″  is above the competitive price 𝑝𝑐′ . In 
the competitive market prior to the innovation everybody sells at the competitive price. Once the 
competitive firm experiences a sudden innovation, it sells at a price slightly lower than it but close 
to it. Thus, the competitive firm undercuts the price for everybody in the market. It would ideally 
produce at 𝑀𝑅 = 𝑀𝐶 but is unable to push the price above 𝑝𝑐′ . 
 
2 Note that with a drastic innovation when there is a sharp decline in the marginal cost, such that c2 is much lower, it 
is possible for 𝑞𝑚′′  to exceed 𝑞𝑐′ , which we explore further. With a drastic innovation the incentives for both the 
competitive and monopolistic firm converge, as the profit level achievable by the monopoly approaches that of the 
perfect competitor. 
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Figure 2. Effect of innovation with nonconstant MC 
 
With rising MC as in Figure 2, we have 
dqcqMC += 11 )( , 
where 𝑑 > 0 is the slope of the marginal cost function. At the competitive outcome, the firm would 
sell at pMC = , that is, 
bqadqcqMC −=+= 11 )(  which gives 
db
ca
qc +
−
= 1            (12) 
as the total output of the firm if it behaves competitively. The competitive price is, respectively,  
01 
+
+
=
db
bcad
pc           (13) 
Similarly, after the introduction of the innovation the firm could potentially produce a greater 
output at a lower price as follows: 
db
ca
qc +
−
= 2  and  02 
+
+
=
db
bcad
pc       (14) 
Since 21 cc  , for symmetrical expressions of output and price, we see that competitive output 
increases with the innovation, that is, cc qq  . Along the market demand curve, this leads to a 
reduction in the price such that cc pp  . But the competitive firm would have no reason to give up 
on its profit and would, therefore, keep on charging the original price 𝑝𝑐′  or a price close to it while 
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  c2 
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producing the old level of output 𝑞𝑐′  at reduced costs. The rent which the competitive firm achieves 
is 𝜋𝑐 = [𝑝𝑐′ − 𝑀𝐶2(𝑞𝑐′ )]𝑞𝑐′ = [𝑎𝑑 + 𝑏𝑐1𝑏 + 𝑑 − 𝑐2 − 𝑑(𝑎 − 𝑐1)𝑏 + 𝑑 ] (𝑎 − 𝑐1)(𝑏 + 𝑑) = (𝑐1 − 𝑐2)(𝑎 − 𝑐1)(𝑏 + 𝑑) = = 𝛥𝑐 (𝑎−𝑐1)(𝑏+𝑑) = 𝛥𝑐𝑞𝑐′ > 0         (15) 
This rent could be attained if the innovating competitive firm sells at a price slightly lower than 
the equilibrium industry price cp  while incurring lower marginal costs 2MC . The result is identical 
to the one under constant marginal cost and the increase in the profit is exactly the amount c  
since prior to the innovation the competitor earned zero economic profit. Hence, 𝛥𝜋𝑐 = 𝜋𝑐 > 0 
In the case of monopoly, prior to the innovation we have 𝑀𝑅(𝑞) = 𝑎 − 2𝑏𝑞 and 
bqadqcMC 211 −=+=  
This gives optimal monopoly quantity and price 
db
ca
qm +
−
=
2
1   0
2
1 
+
++
=
db
bcadab
pm       (16) 
As can be expected, this output is lower than the optimal competitive output 
db
ca
qc +
−
= 1 . The 
results are identical to those under zero slope 𝑑 of the marginal cost function derived previously. 
Furthermore, the optimal monopoly quantity and price after the innovation are 
db
ca
qm +
−
=
2
2   0
2
2 
+
++
=
db
bcadab
pm       (17) 
Optimal output again increases with the innovation, while optimal monopoly price falls. 
Innovation is, therefore, preferable for society and an innovating monopoly is more justifiable than 
a non-innovating one. Consequently, how sizable the innovation is, determines the increase in 
cumulative monopoly output and profit. 𝑞𝑚″ = 𝑞𝑚′ + 𝛥𝑐2𝑏+𝑑          (18) 
Prior to the innovation, 
  0
)2(
)(
)2(
)(
2
)(
2
)(
2
2
111
1
1
1 +
−
=
+
−






+
−
−−
+
++
=−=
db
cab
db
ca
db
cad
c
db
bcadab
qqMCp mmmm   (19) 
With the innovation the monopoly achieves profit to the amount 
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The increase in profit for the monopolist, therefore, is 𝛥𝜋𝑚 = 𝜋𝑚″ − 𝜋𝑚′ = 𝑏(𝑎 − 𝑐2)2 − 𝑏(𝑎 − 𝑐1)2(2𝑏 + 𝑑)2 = 𝑏(2𝑎 − 𝑐2 − 𝑐1)(𝑐1 − 𝑐2)(2𝑏 + 𝑑)2 = = 𝛥𝑐 𝑏(2𝑎−𝑐1−𝑐2)(2𝑏+𝑑)2 > 0          (21) 
The innovation brings further profit to the monopolist and the result could be expressed as 𝛥𝜋𝑚 = 𝜋𝑚″ − 𝜋𝑚′ = ∆𝑐 𝑏(2𝑏+𝑑) (𝑞𝑚′ + 𝑞𝑚′′ ) > 0,      (22) 
which resembles the results previously obtained. We compare 𝛥𝜋𝑐 and 𝛥𝜋𝑚 again where we know 
that 2𝑞𝑐′ > 𝑞𝑚′ + 𝑞𝑚′′  . This can be seen in Figure 2 where the terms 𝑞𝑚′  and 𝑞𝑚′′  are each smaller 
than 𝑞𝑐′ . ∆𝜋𝑐 = 𝛥𝑐 (𝑎−𝑐1)(𝑏+𝑑) = 𝛥𝑐𝑞𝑐′ > 0         (23) 
It follows, therefore, that 2𝑞𝑐′ > (𝑞𝑚′ + 𝑞𝑚′′ ) > 2𝑏(2𝑏+𝑑) (𝑞𝑚′ + 𝑞𝑚′′ ),       (24) 
where 
2𝑏(2𝑏+𝑑) (𝑞𝑚′ + 𝑞𝑚′′ ) is a fraction of (𝑞𝑚′ + 𝑞𝑚′′ ) and, therefore,  𝑞𝑐′ > 𝑏(2𝑏+𝑑) (𝑞𝑚′ + 𝑞𝑚′′ )         (25) 
This implies that 𝛥𝜋𝑐 > 𝛥𝜋𝑚, 
or again the competitive firm has an advantage in its decision to innovate over the monopoly firm. 
This difference in profits and incentives is bigger the less drastic the innovation. The more drastic 
the innovation and the greater the reduction in marginal cost, the lower the advantage of perfect 
competition over monopoly. The less drastic the innovation, the greater the advantage of the 
competitive firm over monopoly and the higher its profits of innovating. This is because with a 
non-drastic innovation the monopoly produces close to its original level of output and price and 
no substantial gains accrue to it. With a drastic innovation however, the monopoly output increases 
substantively, reducing thus the advantages of the competitive firm and increasing the profit of the 
monopolist.  𝛥𝜋𝑚 = ∆𝑐 𝑏(2𝑏+𝑑) (2𝑞𝑚′ + ∆𝑐2𝑏+𝑑)        (26) 
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From this last result we deduce that the increase in monopoly profit is bigger, the lower the slope 
of the demand curve b and that of the marginal cost curve d. The less elastic the market demand 
curve, the more slowly the output of the monopolist grows. 
 
Subcase 2. 𝑞𝑚″ > 𝑞𝑐′  
In this case the post-innovation price of the monopolist 𝑝𝑚″  is lower than the competitive price 𝑝𝑐′ . 
This would be the result of a substantive drop in marginal cost as well as steeper marginal cost 
MC. In this case the innovating competitive firm does not sell close to the competitive price but at 𝑀𝑅 = 𝑀𝐶 which is the monopoly outcome after the innovation. From a perfect competitor the 
firm turns into a pure monopoly, thus maximizing its profit (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3. Effect of innovation with steep MC 
 
After the innovation, the perfect competitor achieves the post-innovation monopoly profit 𝜋𝑚″ , 
where his profit increases from zero. Thus, 𝛥𝜋𝑐 = 𝜋𝑚″             (27) 
At the same time, because of the innovation the increase of profit for the monopolist is 𝛥𝜋𝑚 =𝜋𝑚″ − 𝜋𝑚′ , which again implies that 𝛥𝜋𝑐 > 𝛥𝜋𝑚. In all cases discussed the perfectly competitive 
firm gains more from the innovation than a pure monopolist. 
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3. Conclusions 
 
Our analysis indicates that both the monopoly and the competitive firm have incentives to innovate 
because both see profits rise after the innovation. Even a minor technological advancement 
increases their profit and improves society’s welfare. The competitive firm has greater incentives 
to innovate since the increase in profits it achieves is greater. An innovative technology will give 
a clear marketing advantage to the competitor over the rest of the firms in the industry. Even a 
minor innovation would help the competitive firm attract all market demand. However, the 
competitor is constrained by the lack of funding due to modest profits and lack of capital. 
Therefore, the competitive firm is less likely to generate a major innovation than the monopoly. 
From the viewpoint of profit, motivation, and competition, the competitive firm is more 
likely to adopt new technologies. From the viewpoint of funding, budgeting, and stay-out pricing 
as a form of preventing competition, monopoly and oligopoly are more likely to invest in new 
technologies. The more drastic the innovation, the greater the increase in profits for the monopoly 
and the greater its motivation to innovate. This implies that monopolies would likely pursue 
deeper, drastic innovations, rather than minor improvements in production which achieve 
insignificant cost economies. The monopoly is better off with the innovation since the reduction 
in the price serves as an entry-limit pricing device and keeps competitors out of the industry. The 
presumably “sleepy” monopolist, relying on firm, guaranteed profits, is not so “sleepy” and would 
strive to innovate. An innovating monopoly is advantageous both for the firm and society. 
Although a single firm offering in an industry, the monopoly is encouraged to innovate by higher 
profits. 
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